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Administrative Law. Rollingwood Acres, Inc. v. Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management, 212 A.3d 1198 (R.I.
2019). Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice for Small
Businesses and Individuals Act (EAJA), an agency must reimburse
a plaintiff for litigation expenses when the agency’s actions are not
substantially justified. 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Rollingwood Acres, Inc. (Rollingwood) owns property located on
Route 7 in Smithfield, Rhode Island (the property), on which
Smithfield Peat Co., Inc. and Smithfield Crushing Co., LLC
(collectively, Plaintiffs) operate their businesses. 2 Smithfield Peat
obtained a permit from the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management (DEM) to alter freshwater wetlands.3
In order to comply with the requirements of the permit, Smithfield
Peat had to use fifteen-inch-diameter discharge pipes in their
drainage structure, which cost the company $100,000 and took two
years to construct. 4 During a project to improve Route 7, the Rhode
Island Department of Transportation (DOT) switched the fifteeninch-diameter pipe with an eighteen-inch-diameter pipe.5 The
switch caused the drainage system to discharge more turbid water
than permitted into a nearby stream and, in 1996, a DOT employee
filed a complaint with the DEM about this issue. 6 On June 3, 1997,
the DEM issued a Notice of Intent to Enforce (NOIE) requiring the

1. Rollingwood Acres, Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 212 A.3d 1198,
1212 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 1200. “Smithfield Peat operates a leaf and yard waste
composting facility at the property” and “Smithfield Crushing operates a rock
crushing facility at the property.” Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1200–01.
5. Id. at 1201.
6. Id. Turbid water is sediment-laden water. Id.
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Plaintiffs to alter their drainage structure, but the Plaintiffs did not
take action and the DEM did not enforce the NOIE. 7
On February 9, 2005, a DEM site inspector revisited the
property while in the area on another inspection and noticed an
“oily sheen” in one of the Plaintiffs’ retention ponds. 8 The site
inspector notified the Plaintiffs and they immediately hired a
company to contain and clean up the oil discharge. 9 The DEM
performed follow-up testing and sampling on the property. 10 The
first set of samples could not be used because they were taken from
an unconnected stream. 11 The second set of samples were taken
downstream, instead of upstream.12
The DEM issued a Notice of Violation on November 6, 2006,
which charged the Plaintiffs with violating the Rhode Island Water
Pollution Act, DEM’s Water Quality Regulations, the Rhode Island
Oil Pollution Control Act, DEM’s Oil Pollution Control Regulations,
and DEM’s Regulations for the Rhode Island Pollution Discharge
Elimination System. 13 The Plaintiffs appealed to the
Administration Adjudication Division (AAD) and an administrative
hearing was held five years later. 14 The Plaintiffs filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to join the DOT as a party and the motion was
denied. 15
On June 27, 2012, the AAD hearing officer issued a Merits
Decision dismissing all but two of the Plaintiffs’ violations because
the DEM had not met its burden of proof.16 The hearing officer
dismissed the water pollution violations because the DEM’s
background samples “were not taken in accordance with the Water
Quality Regulations and [were] of no use in proving a turbidity
violation.” 17 The hearing officer also opined that “[a]fter hearing
all the evidence on the issue of turbidity, it is clear that [Plaintiffs]
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1201–02.
Id. at 1202.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were victimized by [DOT].” 18 On the separate issue of the alleged
oil pollution violations, the hearing officer found that the Plaintiffs
were liable under a strict liability theory because they received
products contaminated with oil and were responsible for the oil
discharge, but the administrative penalty was reduced from
$31,470 to $2,615.19 Both parties appealed the Merits Decision to
the Superior Court, which subsequently dismissed these appeals.20
Under the EAJA and Rule 1.20 of the DEM’s ADD Rules, the
Plaintiffs filed a request for litigation expenses on July 27, 2012. 21
The hearing officer denied the Plaintiffs’ request because he found
that the Plaintiffs were not “parties” under the EAJA.22 The
Plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the
Plaintiffs were “parties” under the EAJA and remanded the case,
instructing the AAD to determine the merits of the Plaintiffs’
litigation expenses claim. 23 The hearing officer denied the
Plaintiffs’ request, finding that DEM had acted with substantial
justification. 24 The Plaintiffs again appealed to the Superior Court,
which upheld the AAD’s denial of reasonable litigation expenses. 25
The Plaintiffs subsequently petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme
Court (the Court) for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court reviewed the trial justice’s denial of the Plaintiffs’
motion for reasonable litigation expenses under the EAJA. 27 In
doing so, the Court applied a de novo standard of review because
the case involved a question of law. 28 The Court explained that the
EAJA permitted individuals and small businesses to recover
reimbursement for reasonable litigation expenses when an agency
18.
19.
20.
21.
§ 1.20).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-4 and 250-10-00 R.I. Code R.
Id.
Id. at 1203–04.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1205–1206.

538 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:535
committed an action without substantial justification. 29 The
determining factor in this analysis is whether the administrative
agency was “substantially justified in its actions.” 30 The Court
noted that substantial justification requires “the initial position of
the agency, as well as the agency’s position in the proceedings, [to
have] a reasonable basis in law and fact.” 31 The Court further
noted that other courts look to the underlying merits decision to
determine whether the agency’s position was substantially
justified. 32
The Court first examined whether the 1996 complaint served
as a reasonable basis for issuing the 2006 NOV. 33 The Court
recognized that the DEM would generally have authority to
investigate complaints and that hearing officers can deny a
petitioner’s request for litigation expenses if “the division was
charged by statute with investigating a complaint that led to the
adjudicatory proceeding.” 34 However, the Court found that there
was not a sufficient relationship between the 1996 complaint and
the 2006 NOV to allow DEM to claim it was substantially
justified. 35 The Court reasoned that DEM did not take action after
the initial 1996 complaint, but rather revived its action against the
Plaintiffs only after one of its site inspectors visited the property
while he was in the area investigating an unrelated complaint. 36
Next, the Court reviewed the trial justice’s finding that the
DEM’s actions were nonetheless substantially justified, despite the
fact that they were not a direct result of the complaint. 37 The Court
reviewed this finding by analyzing three arguments raised by the
Plaintiffs. 38 The Plaintiffs first argued that DEM knew and had
evidence that DOT was responsible for the pipe change. 39 The
29. Id. at 1204 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-49-1(a)–(b)).
30. Id. at 1205 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-3).
31. Id. (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-2(7)).
32. Id. (citing Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330,1331–32
(9th Cir. 1992); Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1988); Tarbox v.
Zoning Bd. of Review of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191, 198 (R.I. 2016)).
33. Id. at 1206.
34. Id. at 1209.
35. Id. at 1209–10.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Court noted that DEM knew DOT ignored environmental
regulations in the past and that DEM had little evidence when they
issued the NOV. The Court stated that an agency’s failure to review
all the evidence before issuing an NOV is precisely the type of
governmental abuse the EAJA was intended to remedy. 40 The
Court concluded that DEM knew or should have known of DOT’s
involvement and, as such, should have held DOT responsible, not
the Plaintiffs.41
The Plaintiffs next argued that although DEM knew its water
samples could not support a legally viable claim, the agency
improperly issued the NOV nonetheless.42 The hearing officer had
found DEM’s water samples were irrelevant because they were not
valid upstream samples. 43 Accordingly, the Court found that the
lack of valid samples was further evidence that DEM did not have
substantial justification. 44
Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that DEM had no basis for
issuing the two dismissed oil pollution violations. 45 The Court
pointed out that there was no evidence the Plaintiffs were aware of
the oil spills before the notification was issued, and that the
Plaintiffs began cleaning up as soon as they received notice of the
oil spill.46 Thus, the Court found that DEM failed to demonstrate
it acted with substantial justification in regard to its actions leading
up to the adjudicatory proceeding. 47
COMMENTARY
The Court was fairly quick to dismiss DEM’s argument that it
had a reasonable basis for issuing the violation because the
Plaintiffs failed to report the oil spill immediately. 48 Instead, the
Court concluded that DEM did not have a reasonable basis because
“the record [was] devoid of any evidence that plaintiffs were aware
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1211.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1212.
Id.
See id. at 1211–1212.
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of the contamination before that time.” 49 However, there was
evidence that the Plaintiffs registered with the EPA as a smallquantity generator of oil, which tends to show that there was
evidence the Plaintiffs at least should have known about the oil
discharge. 50 The Court even noted that the trial justice had relied
on this evidence to conclude that DEM had a reasonable basis for
believing the Plaintiffs knew about the oil discharge before DEM’s
discovery.51 Thus, the Court should have addressed whether or not
the Plaintiffs should have known about the oil discharge.
Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of
the oil discharge, it is likely that a small-quantity generator of oil
is responsible for monitoring its oil discharge levels, which would
make it more likely that the DEM had a reasonable basis for
believing that the Plaintiffs failed to report the spill immediately. 52
If DEM had a reasonable basis for issuing the violation, then it
would have been substantially justified in its actions.53
Accordingly, if DEM was substantially justified in in its actions,
then it would not be responsible for reimbursing the Plaintiffs for
reasonable litigation expenses in regard to this particular
violation. 54
CONCLUSION
The Court concluded that DEM acted without substantial
justification when pursuing various charges against the
Plaintiffs. 55 The Court remanded the case to the Superior Court
with directions to grant the Plaintiffs $69,581.25 in attorney’s fees
and $5,628.75 for the stenographic records.56
Tiffany L. Wallace

49. Id. at 1211.
50. See id. at 1210.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 1204 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-2(7)).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1204 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-49-1(a) and (b)).
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id.

